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BEYOND THE FRUIT TREE: A PROPOSAL FOR THE REVI-
SION OF THE ASSIGNMENT OF INCOME DOCTRINE-
Caruth Corp. v. United States, 865 F.2d 644 (5th Cir. 1989).
Abstract: The Supreme Court developed the assignment of income doctrine to solve the
question of who the proper taxpayer is under section 61 of the Internal Revenue Code.
The question arises when individuals transfer income that rightly belongs to them without
declaring the income for federal tax purposes. The assignment doctrine attributes income,
for tax purposes, to the earner or practical owner of the income notwithstanding that
person's assignment of the income. However, the Supreme Court's development of the
doctrine has been inadequate, as exemplified by the recent decision of the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals in Caruth Corp. v. United State& Caruth demonstrates the improper
focus of the traditional doctrine on form rather than substance. The doctrine should be
redefined to attribute assigned income to taxpayers based upon who controls and enjoys
that income rather than upon the form of the transaction in which the income was
transferred.
The first principle of income taxation is "that income must be taxed
to him who earns it."' Section 61 of the Internal Revenue Code
(Code) defines gross income as "all income from whatever source
derived."2 The Supreme Court has declared that "[t]he broad sweep
of this language indicates the purpose of Congress to use the full mea-
sure of its taxing power within those definable categories" of the tax-
ing statute.' The Code, however, assumes that the proper taxpayer
will report the income: no provision defines who should' assume the
tax liability once sums have been identified as income. Therefore, the
courts have been called upon to fashion rules for identifying the proper
taxpayer.4
One such rule is the assignment of income doctrine which holds that
one who earns income cannot escape tax upon that income by
assigning it to another.5 The assignment doctrine is designed to pre-
vent taxpayers6 from shifting income to avoid paying federal income
tax on it. But, before one may decide that an individual is attempting
to shift income, one must determine that the individual was entitled to
that income in the first instance. Thus, the assignment doctrine goes
to the heart of the question: who is the proper taxpayer?
1. Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733, 739-40 (1949).
2. See I.R.C. § 61 (1982 & Supp. V 1987) for complete text. The statute defining "gross
income" has remained substantially unchanged since the inception of the income tax.
3. Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 334 (1940).
4. 3 B. BITTKER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFrs 1 75.4.6. (1986)
[hereinafter BITrKER].
5. See Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. Ill (1930).
6. This Note uses "taxpayer" to refer to all persons who are required to report their income to
the Internal Revenue Service (Service).
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In Caruth Corp. v. United States,7 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was presented with the question of who
should report a corporate dividend where the stock entitled to the divi-
dend was transferred to a charity after the declaration date but before
the record date.8 The transferor was the controlling stockholder and
the transferred shares were noncumulative and callable by the corpo-
ration for a fixed price. In a rote application of the assignment doc-
trine, the Caruth court held that since the donor had given up the
stock, the dividend income was attributable to the charity.9 The court
failed to look beyond the formal transaction to investigate the practi-
cal avenues of control and enjoyment the donor retained.
The outcome of Caruth is incompatible with the intent of the assign-
ment doctrine to tax the practical owner of the income.'0 The assign-
ment doctrine should be modified to prevent such a result and to
ensure consistency and equality for taxpayers. This Note reviews
selected landmark Supreme Court assignment cases, demonstrates
how the Fifth Circuit in Caruth misapplied the doctrine, and presents
a proposal for the modification of the doctrine."
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ASSIGNMENT OF
INCOME DOCTRINE
Supreme Court decisions defining the assignment doctrine can be
grouped into three primary areas based on the nature of the transac-
tion: assignments of earnings, assignments of the right to income from
property, and assignments of both income-producing property and the
income it generates.12
7. 865 F.2d 644 (5th Cir. 1989).
8. The "declaration date" is "[t]he day on which directors of a corporation declare a dividend
as contrasted with date on which the dividend is actually paid." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
368 (5th ed. 1979). The "record date" is "[t]he date on which a person must be registered as a
shareholder on the stock book of a company in order to receive a declared dividend .... " Id. at
1145.
9. Caruth, 865 F.2d at 650.
10. "The dominant purpose of the Revenue laws is the taxation of income to those who earn
or otherwise create the right to receive it and enjoy the benefit of it when paid." Helvering v.
Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 119 (1940).
11. This Note analyzes the assignment of income doctrine only as it applies to nonsale
transfers.
12. Although these cases are several decades old, they remain the leading cases in this area.
See BITTKER, supra note 4, at 1 75.4.6.
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Assignment of Income Doctrine
A. Assignments of Earnings
The assignment doctrine originated in Lucas v. Earl."3 Taxpayer
Earl, an attorney, and his wife executed a contract stating that all
property they then owned or later acquired was to be owned by them
as joint tenants with the right of survivorship. Earl's wife subse-
quently attempted to report half of her husband's income as her own.
The contract notwithstanding, the Commissioner of the Internal Reve-
nue Service (Service) assessed taxes against Earl for the whole of the
salary and attorney's fees he earned. Earl objected, arguing that the
Code taxed only income "beneficially received."' 4
The Court acknowledged the force of Earl's argument, but stated
that the case was not to be decided by such "attenuated subtleties."' 5
Rather, the import of the taxing statute was to prevent the earner from
avoiding the income tax notwithstanding anticipatory contracts or
arrangements that prevented the income from ever vesting in the
earner. Justice Holmes wrote that the taxing statute prohibited
"arrangement[s] by which the fruits are attributed to a different tree
from that on which they grew." 16 This quote, now known as the
"fruit-tree" metaphor, has come to embody the assignment doctrine.
The rule laid down in Earl stands as a cornerstone of the income tax
system.17 Subsequent earnings cases revolve around what constitutes
earnings rather than whether a particular wage-earner may shift earn-
ings income for tax purposes.' 8
B. Assignments of the Right to Income from Property
The second grouping involves assignments of income from property
that transfer only the right to the income. Here, the primary issue is
whether the transferor has retained sufficient control over the use and
enjoyment of the transferred income to impose tax liability upon the
transferor.
In the same year as Earl, the Supreme Court decided Corliss v. Bow-
ers.19 The taxpayer in Corliss created a revocable trust designating his
wife the life income beneficiary and granting the remainder to his chil-
dren. He retained the absolute power to destroy or modify the trust.
13. 281 U.S. Ill (1930) (Holmes, J., for a unanimous Court).
14. Id. at 114.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 114-15.
17. United States v. Basye, 410 U.S. 441, 450 (1973).
18. See, e.g., id (Court did not question that Earl applied once the sums were identified as
earnings).
19. 281 U.S. 376 (1930).
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Section 219 of the Revenue Act of 1924 provided that a grantor of a
trust should be taxed on the trust income if at any time during the year
the grantor could have revested any part of the corpus of the trust.
Despite section 219, the taxpayer in Corliss argued that he should not
be taxed on the trust income because he never held title to the
20income.
The Court rejected the taxpayer's argument, stating that taxation is
not determined by refinements of title.21 Rather, principles of taxation
turn on who had actual command over the property taxed. Income
subject to the unlimited control of a person is rightly attributed to that
person for tax purposes, no matter how that person sees fit to enjoy the
income. The control Corliss retained over the revocable trust made it
proper to tax him on the trust's income.22
Unlike Corliss, which involved a grantor, the later case of Blair v.
Commissioner, 23 involved the tax liability of a grantee. In Blair, a life
income beneficiary assigned part of his life estate to his children.
Focusing on the fact that the part given was coextensive with the
assignor's interest in the trust, the Court held that the assigned income
was not taxable to the assignor because he no longer had any claim to
the part given. The life interest in the trust corpus was considered a
form of "property" of which the assignor completely transferred a
part.24 That the transfer was for the assignor's entire life distinguished
this case from the transfer involved in Corliss.25
In contrast to Blair stands Harrison v. Schaffner.26 In Harrison, the
taxpayer assigned to her children fixed dollar amounts from income to
be generated rather than assigning a portion of the trust corpus for
20. Id. at 377-78.
21. Id. at 378.
22. Id. Later, in Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940), the Court reaffirmed its position
that the salient question was whether the grantor may still be considered the recipient of the
income for tax purposes after the trust was created. The taxpayer in Clifford created a five-year
trust, naming his wife beneficiary and himself both remainderman and trustee. He retained
"absolute discretion" to determine how much, if any, of the trust income was to be paid to his
wife and complete control over the disposition of the underlying trust assets. Id. at 332-33, 335.
The Court concluded that as Clifford had not surrendered practical ownership, he was the
proper taxpayer. Id. at 335. "The bundle of rights which he retained was so substantial that
respondent cannot be heard to complain that he is the 'victim of despotic power when for the
purpose of taxation he is treated as owner altogether.' " Id. at 337 (quoting Du Pont v.
Commissioner, 289 U.S. 685, 689 (1933)).
23. 300 U.S. 5 (1937).
24. Id. at 13-14.
25. Id. at 12.
26. 312 U.S. 579 (1941).
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life, as in Blair. The Court found that the taxpayer parted with noth-
ing save the specified dollar amounts, which were income attributable
to her under the assignment doctrine.27
Read together, Blair and Harrison fix the line between transfers of
income that shift the associated tax liability and those that do not. A
transferor remains liable for the tax on future income so long as the
transferor retains control over the income, including the power to
decide whether it will be generated and who will receive it.
Like the assignments of earnings cases, the foregoing cases may be
cast in terms of the traditional fruit-tree metaphor. The income-pro-
ducing property is the tree, the income generated is the fruit, and the
fruit may not be attributed to a different tree from which it grew.
C. Assignments of Both Income-Producing Property and the Income
Generated
Cases involving assignments of both income-producing property
and the resultant income required the Court to look beyond the tradi-
tional fruit-tree metaphor. The celebrated case of Helvering v. Horst,28
presented the Court with facts under which a mechanical application
of the fruit-tree metaphor would not have identified the proper tax-
payer. In Horst, the taxpayer detached interest coupons from bonds,
just prior to their due date, and gave them to his son. Although the
son collected the interest at maturity, the Commissioner of the Service
determined that these interest payments were income to the father.29
The Court held that the father's control and enjoyment of the
income sufficed to establish him as the recipient of the income.1° As
holder of the bond and coupons, the father had the legal right to
demand payment of the interest at maturity.31 The Court recognized,
as it had in Corliss,32 that the power to command disposal of income
was tantamount to enjoyment of that income.33 The father's ability to
27. Id. at 583.
28. 311 U.S. 112 (1940).
29. Id. at 114.
30. Id. at 117.
31. Id. at 115.
32. See supra text accompanying note 22.
33. The Court wrote:
Underlying the reasoning in these cases is the thought that income is 'realized' by the
assignor because he, who owns or controls the source of the income, also controls the
disposition of that which he could have received himself and diverts the payment from
himself to others as the means of procuring the satisfaction of his wants. The taxpayer has
equally enjoyed the fruits of his labor or investment and obtained the satisfaction of his
desires whether he collects and uses the income to procure those satisfactions, or whether he
disposes of his right to collect it as the means of procuring them.
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direct the payment of the interest to his son represented a taxable eco-
nomic realizati6n to the father.34 The enjoyment the father derived
from bestowing this gift upon his son constituted sufficient economic
gain to hold the father taxable on the interest.3
The Court in Horst could simply have applied the fruit-tree meta-
phor, treating the coupons-because they were independently negotia-
ble-as the tree and their interest as the fruit.36 However, applying
the fruit-tree metaphor would have produced results inconsistent with
the taxing statute's objective to tax income to the person who earns it,
or creates and enjoys it.37 Horst represented a step toward transform-
ing the assignment doctrine from its simplistic fruit-tree labels to a
doctrine focused on economic realities.
The Supreme Court further refined the assignment doctrine in Com-
missioner v. Sunnen."8 Sunnen involved several licenses between an
inventor and the corporation he controlled.39 The licenses allowed,
but did not require, the corporation to manufacture various products
for which the inventor held patents. In return, the corporation agreed
to pay the inventor royalties of ten percent of gross sales. The licenses
were terminable by either party upon notice without liability.' °
The taxation issue in Sunnen arose after the inventor assigned the
rights to the royalties and underlying licenses to his wife. 4 The inven-
tor claimed that the royalties should be taxed to his wife because he
transferred both the income and the underlying assets to her. The
Court, framing the issue as "whether the assignor retains sufficient
power and control over the assigned property or over receipt of the
income to make it reasonable to treat him as the recipient of the
income for tax purposes," held that the inventor was the proper
taxpayer.42
The Sunnen Court reached its conclusion by evaluating the control
the inventor retained over the royalties via the licenses.43 As the con-
trolling shareholder, the inventor could control what royalties, if any,
Horst, 311 U.S. at 116-17.
34. Id. at 120.
35. Id. at 117.
36. See id. at 120 (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
37. Id. at 119.
38. 333 U.S. 591 (1948).
39. The inventor owned 89% of the outstanding stock. Id. at 593.
40. Id. at 594.
41. Id. at 595.
42. Id. at 604.
43. Id. at 608-09.
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his wife would receive. The inventor, moreover, would benefit indi-
rectly from the royalty payments made to his wife." As the Court
noted, this taxpayer was left with "something more than a memory., 4 5
Two distinct principles emerge from a synthesis of the historical
development of the assignment doctrine: control and enjoyment.
Underlying the analysis in each case is a concern for whether the tax-
payer has retained sufficient incidents of ownership to treat that tax-
payer as the practical owner.
II. CAR UTH CORPORATION v. UNITED STA TES
A. Facts and Procedural History
Taxpayers W. W. and Mabel Caruth4 6 were majority shareholders
in North Park, Inc. and sole shareholders in another company, the
Caruth Corporation.47 North Park had issued 50 shares of Class A
voting common stock, 450 shares of Class B nonvoting common stock,
and 1000 shares of nonvoting preferred stock. The preferred stock
was noncumulative, 48 and could be called by North Park for $100 per
share upon thirty-days notice.49 Caruth owned seventy-five percent of
the Class A and Class B stock and all of the preferred stock. Caruth's
nephews owned the remaining twenty-five percent of the Class A and
Class B stock. 0
For a number of reasons, Caruth considered declaring a dividend
and winding down North Park in April of 1978.51 Caruth had previ-
ously attempted to buy his nephews' shares in the corporation, but
44. Id. at 610.
45. Id. at 608.
46. Hereinafter, most references will be to Mr. Caruth (Caruth) alone, as he was the primary
actor in the relevant transactions.
47. Caruth Corp. v. United States, 865 F.2d 644, 646-47 (5th Cir. 1989).
48. Preferred stock is often noncumulative; this means that if a dividend is not paid in a
particular year, that dividend is gone forever and the corporation has no obligation to pay them
when the next dividend is paid. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 949 (5th ed. 1979).
49. The back side of the certificates read, in part:
The preferred stock is non cumulative, and the holders of the preferred stock shall be
entitled only to share pro-rata with the holders of common stock in all dividends, when and
as declared and made payable by the board of directors of the corporation. The corporation
may at any time at the option of the board of directors, redeem the whole or any part of the
outstanding preferred stock on any date after issuance by paying One Hundred Dollars
($100.00) for each share thereof.
Caruth, 865 F.2d at 646-47.
50. Id. at 646.
51. Caruth testified at his deposition that he was the one who decided that the corporation
would declare a dividend and in what amount. Memorandum of Law at 3, Caruth v. United
States, 88-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9514 (N.D. Tex. 1987) (No. CA-3-84-0877-R).
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they had refused to sell. Caruth believed that declaring a large divi-
dend would motivate his nephews to sell so they could realize capital
gains instead of ordinary income. Additionally, because Caruth Cor-
poration's activities were increasing, Caruth wanted to use North Park
stock to make a capital contribution to the Caruth Corporation.
Finally, Caruth knew of, and wished to avoid, a possible imposition of
the accumulated earnings tax against North Park.5 2
By letter dated April 14, Caruth advised the Dallas Community
Chest Trust Fund (Community Chest) that he was contemplating a
substantial gift of North Park stock. 3 On May 5, Caruth began exe-
cuting his plans by transferring to the Caruth Corporation all Class B
shares he held. On May 8, he caused North Park to declare a dividend
of $1,500 per share, payable on May 17, to shareholders of record as of
May 15. On May 9, the day after the declaration date but before the
May 15 record date, he transferred all 1000 preferred shares to the
Community Chest. 4 Caruth then deducted $1,600,000 as a charitable
deduction from his gross income for federal income tax purposes.5
He did not report the transferred stock dividends as taxable income. 6
The Service objected, claiming that the preferred stock dividend was
attributable to Caruth under the assignment doctrine.5 7 Caruth paid
the deficiencies under protest, then sued for a refund in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. The district
52. Caruth Corp. v. United States, 865 F.2d 644, 647 (5th Cir. 1989). The accumulated
earnings tax is "[a] special tax imposed on corporations that accumulate (rather than distribute
via dividends) their earnings beyond the reasonable needs of the business." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 20 (5th ed. 1979). See also I.R.C. §§ 531-37 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (current
version at I.R.C. §§ 531-537 (1982 & Supp. V 1987)). No dividend had ever been declared by
North Park and no other dividend was ever declared. Caruth, 865 F.2d at 647.
53. Caruth, 865 F.2d at 647.
54. Id. Caruth informed the Community Chest that these shares should be deposited in the
"W.W. Caruth Jr. Fund." Caruth v. United States, 88-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) q 9514, at 85,513
n.6 (N.D. Tex. 1987).
55. Shortly after the transfer, a bank had valued the preferred shares for the Community
Chest at $1,600 per share: $1,500 per share for the dividend plus the call value of $100 per share.
Caruth, 88-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 85,514 n.12. Restrictions in the Code forced Caruth to spread out
the deductions over four years. Brief for the Appellant at 6, Caruth Corp. v. United States, 865
F.2d 644 (5th Cir. 1989) (No. 88-1015) [hereinafter Appellant's Briefi.
56. Thus, out of $2,250,000 in total dividends paid by North Park, Caruth declared only
$56,250, while his nephews declared $187,500. Appellant's Brief, supra note 55, at 5. The
Caruth Corporation received $506,250 in dividends, id., but should have been able to deduct
85% of dividends received pursuant to § 243. See I.R.C. § 243 (1976) (current version at I.R.C.
§ 243 (1982 & Supp. V 1987)). Finally, the bulk of the dividends, $1,500,000, went to the
Community Chest and was not taxed. See I.R.C. § 501 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (current version
at I.R.C. § 501 (1982 & Supp. V 1987)).
57. Caruth Corp. v. United States, 865 F.2d 644, 648 (5th Cir. 1989).
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court held in favor of Caruth58 and the Service appealed the ruling to
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.5 9
B. The Fifth Circuit's Holding in Caruth
Relying on the fruit-tree metaphor, the Fifth Circuit held that
because the stock, which represented the tree, had been transferred
with its fruit dividend, Caruth did not have to report the dividend
income.' The Service argued that the dividend income should be
attributed to Caruth because this fruit was exceptionally ripe when
transferred." The court countered that as long as the entire tree is
transplanted before it is harvested, the ripeness of the fruit does not
matter.62 The court viewed the "crucial question" as "whether the
asset itself, or merely the income from it, has been transferred."63
Caruth timed the transaction so that the transfer of stock to the
charity occurred after the declaration date but before the record date.
The court dismissed this point in light of the distinction the Service
has drawn in the sales context between record dates and declaration
datesA4 Applying this distinction, the court stated that Caruth was
never legally entitled to collect the preferred shares dividend under
either Texas or federal tax law. However, to reinforce its conclusion
that ripeness did not matter, the court noted that after the transfer
Caruth could not prevent the dividend from vesting with the Commu-
nity Chest or another party of its choice.65 Thus, the court implicitly
58. Caruth v. United States, 88-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCMI) 9514 (N.D. Tex. 1987).
59. Caruth, 865 F.2d at 648.
60. Id. at 650. The court also consideied whether the case involved a "sham transaction," an
issue largely outside the scope of this Note.
61. Id at 649.
62. Id
63. Id. at 648.
64. Id. at 649. The court cited Treasury Regulation section 1.61-9(c):
When stock is sold after the declaration of a dividend and after the date as of which the
seller becomes entitled to the dividend, [the record date], the dividend ordinarily is income
to the seller. When stock is sold between the time of declaration and the time of payment of
the dividend, and the sale takes place at such time that the purchaser becomes entitled to the
dividend, the dividend ordinarily is income to him.
Treas. Reg. § 1.61-9(c) (1954) (emphasis added).
The court's reliance on this regulation is inappropriate for three reasons. First, the regulation
applies only to sales of stock. Presumably, a sales price reflects the combined value of the stock
and its impending dividend, indicating that the seller was relinquishing control over both. Sec-
ond, a seller of stock requires a willing buyer, so the seller cannot completely control the timing
of the transaction, unlike a nonsale transferor who has complete control over timing. Third, the
regulation is explicitly limited to "ordinary" situations. As recognized by the court, the transac-
tion at issue in Caruth was far from "ordinary." Caruth, 865 F.2d at 645.
65. Id. at 650.
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recognized that as of the declaration date, the shareholders had com-
plete control over the disposition of the pending dividend.
Finally, according to the court, Caruth's control over North Park
did not "deprive the preferred shares of their status as an income-pro-
ducing asset. ' ' 66 Thus, "the preferred stock was the tree that grew the
fruit, rather than merely a crate for conveying the fruit.",67 The extent
of the analysis can be summed up as follows: "Caruth gave away the
goose that laid the golden eggs, and so lost his entitlement to any later
eggs the goose might lay.",
68
III. ASSIGNMENT OF INCOME DOCTRINE:
APPLICATION, MISAPPLICATION, AND NEEDED
REVISIONS
A. The Theory Behind the Supreme Court's Assignment of Income
Doctrine
The assignment doctrine focuses on two issues: control and enjoy-
ment. The degrees of control which taxpayers may exercise occupy a
continuum. At one end are earnings from work, which are always
under the worker's direct control. Earnings accrue solely because of
the worker's efforts, so the worker can determine the existence of the
earnings income by performing or withholding services.69
Cases involving income from assets occupy the middle of the contin-
uum. In these cases, the taxpayer retains the productive asset but
transfers the income. By manipulating the underlying asset, the tax-
payer may determine the existence and amount of income produced.
As with attempted shifts of earnings, the transferor is taxed on the
income because the transferor controls the underlying asset.7 °
The middle and direct-control areas of the continuum present rela-
tively few problems for courts and taxpayers. Here, the traditional
fruit-tree doctrine can be applied with proper results. Earnings are
attributed to the earner, and income from property is attributed to the
property owner. In both cases, one can easily identify both the fruit
and the tree, and thus can attribute the fruit to the tree upon which it
grew. The form of the transaction reveals the factors that are germane
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See supra text accompanying notes 13-16. Taxpayers who simply refuse to accept
compensation for future work and who do not designate a beneficiary, however, are generally not
taxed on the foregone compensation. See Commissioner v. Giannini, 129 F.2d 639 (9th Cir.
1942); Rev. Rul. 66-167, 1966-1 C.B. 20.
70. See supra notes 19-27 and accompanying text.
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to taxation-control and enjoyment. Courts therefore can determine
the proper taxpayer by merely identifying the transaction's form.
Problems arise, however, at the opposite end of the continuum.
Cases at the indirect-control end of the continuum involve taxpayers
who have given up legal ownership of both the income and the
income-producing property, yet who still manage to indirectly control
both. Caruth illustrates cases found at this end of the continuum.
These cases are resolved by focusing on the relationships among the
transferor, the transferred asset, and the transferee. If these relation-
ships establish the transferor's practical ownership of the transferred
asset, the income will be attributed to the transferor.7'
In cases such as Caruth, control over income from property exists
because of the property's intimate association with an intermediary-
either other property or an entity the taxpayer controls. The tax-
payer's control over the intermediary enables the taxpayer to abandon
all legal right to both the income and its parent property and yet to
still exercise dominion over them. Such an intimate relationship
existed between the bond and the interest coupons in Horst, between
the licenses and the royalties in Sunnen, and between North Park and
its preferred shares in Caruth. By controlling the bond, the father in
Horst controlled payment of the interest;72 by controlling the licenses,
the husband in Sunnen controlled payment of the royalties;73 and by
controlling North Park, Caruth controlled the preferred shares.74
Caruth and similar cases also present the problem of timing. Courts
must consider the temporal relationship between when the property
was relinquished and when the income from it vested. If the asset is
pregnant with income when transferred, 75 the transferor should be
taxed on the asset's income because the transferor, by choosing the
particular time for disposing of the property, has controlled the antici-
pated income.
A taxpayer's enjoyment of the income is another indicator of practi-
cal ownership presented by cases like Caruth. The Supreme Court
appears to define "enjoyment" as the ability to procure a satisfaction
71. See supra notes 28-45 and accompanying text.
72. Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 115 (1940); see supra notes 28-37 and accompanying
text.
73. Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 608-09 (1948); see supra text accompanying notes
38-45.
74. Caruth Corp. v. United States, 865 F.2d 644, 646-47 (5th Cir. 1989); see supra notes
47-50 and accompanying text.
75. Such arrangements often are referred to as "anticipatory assignments of income." United
States v. Basye, 410 U.S. 441, 449-50 (1973).
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by disposing of the income. Income may be enjoyed directly, by per-
sonally spending the money, or indirectly, by disposing of the right to
collect the income. Satisfaction occurs when taxpayers use or dispose
of their power to receive or control income to procure their wants."6
The principles of control and enjoyment developed by the Supreme
Court through Earl and its successors are in harmony with the basic
idea of our income tax.77 But the Court's case-by-case approach, cou-
pled with its loyalty to the fruit-tree metaphor, has not created an
adequate test for identifying the proper taxpayer in difficult cases. 8
Justice Cardozo recognized the folly of the metaphor: they "are to be
narrowly watched, for starting as devices to liberate thought, they
often end by enslaving it."7 9 By clinging to the fruit-tree metaphor,
the Court has failed to provide guidance to both lower courts and tax-
payers.8' The Caruth decision illustrates the shortcomings of reliance
upon the traditional fruit-tree doctrine.
B. Criticism of the Fifth Circuit's Holding in Caruth
In Caruth, the court focused on the form of the transaction. By so
doing, the court sidestepped the real issue: who is the proper taxpayer?
The court held that because Caruth actually parted with the preferred
shares by the record date, the dividend income was not attributable to
him.8 The court discussed neither the underlying control retained by
Caruth nor the satisfaction he received by donating the shares to a
charity. In this way, the court failed to attribute the dividend income
to the proper taxpayer.
The Caruth decision is flawed for three reasons. First, the Fifth
Circuit ignored the theory behind the assignment of income doctrine.
76. Horst, 311 U.S. at 116-17.
77. See supra note 10.
78. Commentators have criticized courts' use of the fruit-tree metaphor:
From the beginning, rationality has not been a touchstone for decision of questions
concerning the tax consequences of anticipatory assignments of income. Time out of mind,
courts have preferred to ground decisions upon the lightening rod of a metaphor once
thundered from Olympus by Mr. Justice Holmes: 'The fruit may not be attributed to a tree
different from that on which it grew.' . . . Besides being irrational, however, the metaphor
has frustrated an orderly evolution of a generic anticipatory assignment principle.
Teschner, Anticipation of Income, 41 IND. L.J. 587, 588 (1966) (quoting Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S.
111, 115 (1930)); see also Rice, Judicial Trends in Gratuitous Assignments to Avoid Federal
Income Taxes, 64 YALE L.J. 991 (1955).
79. Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 244 N.Y. 84, 94, 155 N.E. 58, 61 (1926).
80. See Teschner, supra note 78, at 588. "The courts eagerly accepted the invitation that the
inquiry they should make in gift assignment cases demands but a determination as to whether the
assignor transferred only income fruit or also assigned a capital tree." Id. at 592.
81. Caruth Corp. v. United States, 865 F.2d 644, 650 (5th Cir. 1989).
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Second, the holding gives taxpayers incentive to devise income-shifting
schemes. Third, the decision fosters the appearance of unfairness in
the application of the federal tax laws.
L The Fifth Circuit Ignored the Theory Behind the Assignment of
Income Doctrine
The assignment doctrine embodies a theory of taxation: the practi-
cal owner of income is the proper taxpayer.82 While in simple cases
the fruit-tree metaphor may offer a convenient shortcut for determin-
ing the proper taxpayer, a court should go one step further and test its
conclusion against the ultimate goal of taxing the income's practical
owner. The Caruth court opted to apply the metaphor but missed the
theory behind the metaphor.
An outline of the control exercised by Caruth illustrates the prob-
lem with the Fifth Circuit's approach. The chain of control over the
preferred shares began with North Park, which had absolute control
over the stock's continued existence and value. Caruth, as majority
shareholder, controlled North Park. This chain of control meant
Caruth retained indirect control over the preferred stock even after
transferring them to the Community Chest. The Fifth Circuit, how-
ever, focused only on Caruth's direct relationship to the preferred
shares, which ended at the date of transfer. The court ignored the
indirect control retained by Caruth over the preferred stock through
his relationship to North Park.
The very nature of the preferred shares evidences Caruth's indirect
control. That North Park could call the stock for $100 per share pro-
duced two consequences. First, the stock would never appreciate. A
rational investor would not buy a share of stock for more than $100 if
the issuing corporation could redeem that share for $100 at any time.
Second, North Park-and thus Caruth-could repurchase the stock at
any time. When coupled with the nonvoting and noncumulative
nature of the stock, these consequences rendered the stock valueless to
anyone save Caruth. Thus, while in form Caruth gave away the stock,
in substance he gave away only the dividend income he had impreg-
nated the stock with just a day before the transfer.
The execution of the preferred stock transfer also establishes
Caruth's control and enjoyment. The timing of the transfer enabled
Caruth to command payment of a large dividend to the charity of his
choice, thus procuring the satisfaction of his wants and enhancing his
stature in the community. Caruth caused the corporation to declare a
82. See supra text accompanying notes 69-76.
Washington Law Review
dividend, impregnating the preferred stock, which he then transferred
to the W.W. Caruth Jr. Fund. In short, through the timing and the
execution of the transaction, Caruth exercised dominion over the
dividend.83
Both the nature of the stock and the execution of the transfer evi-
dence Caruth's practical ownership of the dividend. His indirect con-
trol over the dividend should not have been ignored. Regardless of
whether Caruth transferred the fruit with the tree, the control he exer-
cised and retained indicate that the dividend income should have been
attributed to him.
2. Increased Incentive to Shift Income
The Caruth holding gives incentive to other taxpayers to devise
schemes by which they too can shift their income for tax purposes
while retaining the use and enjoyment of that income. Caruth gave
away the preferred shares-the apparent tree-yet he still determined
who received the dividend income and when, and retained sufficient
control to prevent the shares from bearing fruit again. Caruth had
everything to gain by attempting to avoid the tax liability. At worst,
he might have been required to pay the taxes. Caruth's success at
avoiding his taxes will encourage taxpayers to design mechanisms for
shifting their tax liabilities.
As applied by the Fifth Circuit, the assignment doctrine provides
taxpayers with a formula for tax evasion, not a prohibition. The court
failed to look at the real effect of the transfer, or lack thereof, on the
taxpayer's relationship to the income and its parent asset. The court's
unthinking reliance upon the fruit-tree metaphor serves to entice tax-
payers to concoct disposable property so they can shift their tax liabili-
ties without relinquishing the taxed income. Basing a decision on facts
not material to taxpayers' finances encourages taxpayers to tailor their
activities to satisfy those technicalities, while retaining practical own-
ership of the transferred income.
3. Appearance of Unfairness
The Caruth decision fosters an environment of unfairness. Under
the Caruth court's approach, taxpayers who have the resources to dis-
guise their incomes may do so; the ordinary taxpayer may not. This
can be demonstrated by comparing wage-earners with persons who
83. The Fifth Circuit's failure "to see why the ripeness of the fruit matters, so long as the
entire tree is transplanted before the fruit is harvested," Caruth, 865 F.2d at 649, suggests a lack
of understanding of the assignment doctrine.
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earn their income through capital investments. An entrepreneur like
Caruth, who impregnates stock with a dividend and then transfers it,
avoids the tax liability. A wage-earner who transfers a paycheck,
however, remains liable for the taxes.8
The Fifth Circuit failed to respond to Caruth's manipulation of the
tax laws to achieve his business purpose. Caruth claimed that his pur-
pose in creating a lag-time between the declaration date and the record
date was to force his nephews to sell their stock to avoid being taxed
on the dividend at ordinary income rates.85 Essentially, Caruth
argued that he should not be taxed in this instance because he
intended only to wield the tax laws against his nephews, not the
United States Government.
The tax laws should not provide weapons for people to achieve such
goals. Personal tax planning should be distinguished from intentional
use of the tax laws to interfere with another's tax planning. Rather,
the tax laws should be confined to serving the purpose of generating
revenue and, at most, to promoting social policies as determined and
set forth by Congress. To hold otherwise creates the impression, if not
the reality, of unfairness by rewarding persons who hold positions of
power.
C. The Assignment of Income Doctrine: Areas Needing Revision
L The Traditional Doctrine Cannot Keep Pace with the Growing
Sophistication of Tax Evasion Schemes
The fruit-tree metaphor is an inadequate, if not harmful, approach
to assignment of income cases. The history of the doctrine and its
effect on tax avoidance schemes is noteworthy. Over the decades, tax-
payers have designed increasingly clever schemes to avoid the assign-
ment doctrine.8 6 By responding to the taxpayer's efforts in a way that
preserves the integrity of the fruit-tree metaphor, the Supreme Court
has prevented the formulation of a coherent assignment principle. The
result is that both the IRS and taxpayers are unable to predict the tax
consequences of future transfers of income or income-producing
property.
84. See Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
85. Caruth, 865 F.2d at 647.
86. This trend is played out in the chronology of cases presented above. See supra notes
13-45 and accompanying text (discussing assignment doctrine case law). In each successive case,
the underlying transaction has become more intricate in form. In substance, though, each
transaction has presented the same question: who is the proper taxpayer?
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The Service should not have to appeal every assignment case to the
Supreme Court to obtain a judgment that reflects an understanding
and application of the theory behind the assignment doctrine. Nor
should taxpayers be deterred from making valid transfers of income or
property for fear that they will later be held liable for taxes on the
transferred income. The Supreme Court should devise a doctrine that
will force lower courts, the IRS, and taxpayers to adhere to the intent
of the taxing statute.
2. The Traditional Doctrine Does Not Take Into Account the Ease
with Which Taxpayers May Hide Their Income
In one sense the federal income tax is a voluntary tax. By their
sheer numbers, taxpayers enjoy an advantage over the Service.
Because its resources are limited, the Service fails to detect evasion in
all but the most extreme cases. This fact alone encourages attempts to
shift income, because the risk of being caught is minimal. Moreover,
when detecting problems, the Service begins with information pro-
vided by taxpayers themselves. And after the Service suspects a prob-
lem, most of the pertinent facts are peculiarly within the control of the
taxpayer. In short, the taxpayer is at a distinct advantage.
Judicial reliance on the fruit-tree metaphor merely exacerbates this
problem. As taxpayers control the primary evidence, they can tailor
their transactions to fit the fruit-tree rhetoric and hide the evidence of
their practical ownership. The assignment doctrine should be tailored
to reduce the Service's disadvantage, where possible, and force taxpay-
ers to reveal evidence of their practical ownership.
3. The Traditional Doctrine Violates the Principle of Equal
Treatment Under the Tax Laws
By proceeding ad hoc, the Supreme Court has undermined the
notion that the tax laws should treat taxpayers equally.87 As long as
the traditional fruit-tree doctrine admits of manipulation, some tax-
payers-particularly wealthy ones-will be able to avoid paying tax on
certain income, yet will receive the bounty that the income represents.
Ultimately, taxpayers with the resources to restructure and disguise
their capital investments will be able to avoid taxes; the average wage-
earner will not. The revised assignment doctrine should further "the
most significant tax principle of all: the principle of tax equality."88
87. Teschner, supra note 78, at 588.
88. Id.
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IV. PROPOSAL
While the Tax Reform Act of 1986 has reduced the incentive to
shift income by compressing the former tax brackets,89 the Act did not
totally eliminate the incentive. The present three-rate tax structure
offers a potential tax savings of eighteen percent if a high-bracket tax-
payer successfully shifts income to a low-bracket taxpayer. 90 Charita-
ble donations remain deductible, subject to certain limitations.91 Also,
by donating certain appreciated assets to a charity, the taxpayer can
dispose of income without ever recognizing it for tax purposes. Tax-
payers, like Caruth, then may receive a second tax benefit: a charitable
deduction for the income transferred tax-free. 92
So long as there are two or more tax rates, higher-bracket taxpayers
will have an incentive to shift income to lower-bracket taxpayers. The
greater the disparity between tax rates, the greater the incentive. If
either a more progressive tax structure or capital gains rates were rein-
stituted, the disparity between available tax rates would be increased,
as would the incentive to shift income. For these reasons, the assign-
ment of income doctrine is still a fundamental building block of the
taxing laws.
Two changes, depending on the type of asset transferred, will reha-
bilitate the assignment doctrine as it pertains to nonsale transfers.
First, when corporate stocks are transferred, contemporaneous divi-
dend income should be attributed to the owner of the shares on the
declaration date. Furthermore, persons who exercise control over the
issuing corporation,93 such as controlling shareholders, should be sub-
ject to a special rule: a rebuttable presumption of ownership when they
transfer their stock during an "expectancy period"-between three
and six months-preceeding the declaration of a dividend. Second, in
all other nonsale contexts, control and enjoyment should be the deter-
mining factors. Taxpayers should bear the burden of proving that
89. See I.R.C. § 1 (Supp. V 1987).
90. Id.
91. I.R.C. § 170 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
92. The taxing statute does allow taxpayers to transfer an appreciated asset to a charity,
deduct the current market value of the asset rather than their basis in the asset and thus avoid
paying the tax on the amount of appreciation. See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1 (as amended in 1984).
That provision should be distinguished from the current discussion for two reasons. First, the
appreciated asset deduction is clearly delineated by statute; it represents a policy choice by the
legislature. Transfers of income do not enjoy the same status. Second, an appreciated asset
represents an indeterminate amount of unrealized income. The appreciation value is not realized
until the owner disposes of the property. The assignment of income, however, represents realized
income that would be taxed to the owner but for the subsequent transfer.
93. For an analogous rule on controlling persons, see 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1982).
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they have relinquished both practical and legal ownership of the
income and the income-producing property.
A. Corporate Stock
To avoid future decisions like Caruth, the revised assignment doc-
trine should distinguish between those transfers accomplished by per-
sons who control the issuing corporation and those who do not. When
a noncontrolling shareholder transfers stock, dividends should be tax-
able to the shareholder of record on the declaration date.
This rule would have several benefits. First, it would provide pre-
dictability and certainty, both important objectives of tax jurispru-
dence. To make economically efficient decisions, taxpayers need to
know whether they ultimately will be liable for taxes. Furthermore,
the rule would help prevent taxpayers from "double-dipping" as
Caruth did. Taxpayers transferring income would receive a charitable
deduction for the amount contributed but would report the transferred
income. Finally, the rule would preserve the equal treatment of tax-
payers by making identification of the proper taxpayer turn on facts
beyond the taxpayer's control.
The special rule for controlling persons would create a rebuttable
presumption that all dividends declared during the expectancy period
are attributable to such persons for tax purposes. Taxpayers could
rebut this presumption by showing that, at the time of transfer, they
had not been involved in the dividend decision and had neither actual
knowledge nor any reason to know of the decision. Such a rule would
force lower courts to recognize the indirect control that persons in
controlling positions can exert over the timing of stock dividends.
Application of this rule to the Caruth case would have produced the
proper result.
B. Other Nonsale Transactions
Since the backbone of the assignment doctrine is control and enjoy-
ment, the Supreme Court should adopt a set of questions to probe
those issues. The fundamental question is whether the transferor has
relinquished sufficient control over the transferred income and prop-
erty to have abandoned both legal and practical ownership.
Several questions should be considered to ascertain the proper tax-
payer. First, what is the nature of the asset transferred? Courts
should look at whether the asset has value beyond the income it gener-
ates and whether it is vulnerable to control by someone other than the
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legal owner. Second, what was the nature of the transferor's associa-
tion to the asset before and after the transfer? This question is meant
to probe practical ownership through the means available to the trans-
feror to exert indirect control. Third, what relationships, if any, exist
between the transferor and the transferee that allow the transferor to
continue to control and enjoy the asset? Finally, has the transferor
procured the satisfaction of his or her wants by disposing of this
income? The focus here is on whether the transferor has enjoyed the
income by disposing of it in the time, place, and manner of his or her
choice.
The above test is preferable over the traditional fruit-tree doctrine
because it focuses the court's attention on the substantive issues rather
than on the form of the transaction. Furthermore, the test avoids the
problems that the formalistic approach of the fruit-tree metaphor has
created. Taxpayers would no longer have an incentive to shift their
income because application of the test would require that they forego
the income or be held liable for the taxes.
V. CONCLUSION
While the object of the assignment doctrine remains sound, the
application of the doctrine needs revision. The recent decision by the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Caruth Corp. v. United States illus-
trates the drawbacks of reliance upon the fruit-tree metaphor. There,
the taxpayer was able to shift his tax liabilities while still controlling
and enjoying the taxed income. This result is inconsistent with the
theory behind the assignment doctrine, gives incentive to other tax-
payers to devise tax-avoidance schemes, and violates the notion of tax
equality.
The traditional fruit-tree doctrine is satisfactory as an analytical
tool in only the most obvious of cases. The doctrine glosses over the
issues of control and enjoyment which are the determinative factors in
difficult cases, such as Caruth. The outcome of Caruth taints our fed-
eral tax system as an inherently irrational and unfair institution.
The Supreme Court should devise new tests for the assignment doc-
trine that focus on the theory behind that doctrine. Where possible,
courts should adopt rules employing factors specific to the underlying
assignments. This would provide consistency and equality for taxpay-
ers. Furthermore, taxpayers would know in advance what the result
of a particular transfer would be.
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In the area of corporate stock dividends, the proposed rebuttable
presumption would identify the proper taxpayer because after the dec-
laration date shareholders have the ability to control and enjoy the
pending dividend. Furthermore, as dividends are subject to the con-
trol of those who control the corporation, the intent of the assignment
doctrine calls for a rule that people who enjoy controlling positions in
the issuing corporation presumably own any dividends arising out of
shares they owned while enjoying such a position.
With regard to other forms of income-producing property, the court
should look to the underlying transaction, without regard to what
would have been the fruit or the tree, to see if the transferor retained
the ability to either control or enjoy the income or property. By
answering the questions proposed, a court would be forced to analyze
the substance of the transaction in light of the theory behind the
assignment doctrine. If the transferor has retained sufficient control
or enjoyment, the transferor should remain liable for the taxes on the
income generated.
Traci A. Sammeth
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